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Radicalization into violent extremist groups is on the rise in Western democratic 
countries. This has serious implications for both national and international 
security, and serious attempts at curbing the trend need to be implemented 
immediately. As terrorist attacks continue to be employed by violent extremist 
groups against civilians, it is becoming increasingly clear that the security 
system many states have been accustomed to employing needs a second look. 
The terrorism that is prevalent in modern times is heavily an Islamist form of 
terrorism. ‘Violent Islamist extremism’ has been listed as the preeminent threat 
to Canada’s national security,1 and will therefore be the focus of this paper. 
Groups such as al Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) not only 
plan and carry out violent and deadly attacks, but increasingly utilise new forms 
of technology and social media to promote the group’s ideology abroad and 
recruit new members. More than any other time in history, citizens of Western 
democratic states are increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by these groups. 
This can be seen in the rising numbers of men and women, some as young as 13, 
making the trek to Syria to join ISIS’ proclaimed caliphate. While men have 
typically been the target of terrorist recruiters and academic studies alike, women 
are increasingly being radicalized and leaving their Western lives to join terrorist 
organizations that historically have had little respect for women’s rights.  
 
The focus of this paper will be to investigate the motivations behind 
female radicalization and the national security implications of the rising number 
of women in Canada that are joining terrorist groups overseas. This will include 
the identification of factors that contribute to female radicalization, an 
assessment of the implications of female radicalization for Canada’s national 
security, and the development of recommendations for further prevention of 
radicalization and recruitment into terrorist groups. The paper will ultimately 
conclude that the potential return of radicalized women to Canada from abroad 
necessitates action on behalf of the government, security, and law enforcement 
agencies to establish programs that are capable of legally responding to, 
                                                        
1 Public Safety Canada, Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-terrorism 
Strategy (Ottawa, Ontario: Public Safety Canada, 2012): 2. 
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supporting, and reintegrating these women back into Canadian communities 
without furthering the risk of domestic terrorism.  
 
The first part of this paper will focus on explaining current problems that 
radicalization into violent extremist groups, namely terrorist groups, is creating 
in Canada. This will show that Canada, like many other states, has faced recent 
terrorist attacks on and against their territory, as well as cases of citizens joining 
terrorist groups overseas. It will explain the breakdown of those involved and 
show specific cases of women in Canada who have participated in these actions. 
Trends of women’s involvement internationally will also be explored to show 
the growing need for prevention in this area. This section will also look at the 
roles that women are playing in these terrorist organizations – from jihadi brides 
to suicide bombers.  
 
 The next section of the paper will look at the various factors that could 
explain the rise of radicalized women in general. Factors to be examined include 
the role of recruiters, especially women recruiters, and why they are focusing 
their efforts on recruiting women into their organizations. The role of social 
media has been a well-publicized tool in terrorist organizations’ recruiting 
campaigns, being especially effective in recruiting the younger members of 
society. Social media and its role in the radicalization of women will be 
examined. Motivating factors of radicalization that will be explored include 
identity, integration, political frustration, religion, personal motivations, and 
romanticism. This section will conclude by comparing the expectations of those 
women and girls who become radicalized to the realities of those who have gone 
overseas to join ISIS, and the dangers they pose upon their return.  
 
 The final section of the paper will analyze the implications of radicalized 
women for Canada’s national security. Challenges for law enforcement and 
government policy will be examined, including the intelligence challenges faced 
in identifying radicalized, or radicalizing, women. This section will then 
recommend a number of initiatives and strategies aimed at filling the gaps in 
Canada’s approach to female radicalization and meeting the challenges 
presented by it. An especially important concern that will be addressed is the 
need for effective reintegration support and programs for radicalized Canadian 
women returning home from their life in a terrorist group. Failure to establish 
this support increases the risks to Canadian communities in the coming decade 
through various ways and means. The conclusion will sum up the findings of the 
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factors that play a role in female radicalization and the different risks and 
implications these have for Canada’s national security. 
Background 
While relatively isolated from many of the security problems facing its Western 
allies, Canada has not been completely immune to the tragedies of terrorism. 
Domestically, Canada has been home to anarchist terror groups, environmental 
radicals, and domestic nationalist terrorists such as the Front de libération du 
Québec (FLQ), who have carried out bombings, kidnappings, arson, and 
murders. It has also been home to foreign terrorist groups and their attacks, such 
as the bombing of Air India flight 182, the Toronto 18, and the 2014 shooting of 
Corporal Nathan Cirillo in Ottawa. Abroad, Canadians have been killed in 
terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Somalia, the United States (US), and France – 
in just 2016 alone.  
 
The Toronto 18 offers a look into what could have been a devastating 
attack on Canadian soil. In June 2006, 17 individuals were arrested in the Greater 
Toronto Area for having been part of a plan to carry out wide-spread and large-
scale terrorist attacks. These planned attacks are believed to have included truck 
bombs, open gunfire in busy public areas, the storming of important Canadian 
political and cultural buildings such as the Canadian Parliament and the 
Canadian Broadcasting Center, and the beheading of the Canadian Prime 
Minister.2 The 18 individuals tied to the planned attacks (the ‘Toronto 18’) were 
men primarily aged 18-25, with 4 being minors under the age of 18. Many were 
born in Canada or came to Canada around the ages of 7-12.3 The Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) alleged that the 18 individuals were all 
participants in a form of radical Islam and were inspired by Al Qaeda.4 The idea 
of radicalization occurring on Canadian soil is therefore not new and continues 
to be an increasing concern for Canadian security agencies 10 years on.  
 
Radicalization, as defined by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP), is the process of moving from moderate beliefs to more extreme 
views.5 Those who become radicalized into violent Islamist extremism may 
                                                        
2 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, 
(New York, NY: New York City Police Department, 2007): 76. 
3 “Toronto 18: Key Events in the Case,” CBC News, March 4, 2011, accessed May 19, 2016, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto-18-key-events-in-the-case-1.715266.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Radicalization: A Guide for the Perplexed, 
Hailey Robinsmith       Page 4 
 
 
 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict and 
Warfare  
 
believe in the more extreme teachings of the Quran and believe that they are 
authorized to carry out acts of violence against the government or civilians based 
on these beliefs. They use tactics that incite terror as a means to provoke the 
government into a response that is often disproportionate and corrosive to the 
local environment so that existing moderates become radicalized and their 
support base grows.6 Not all those who hold extremist beliefs are terrorists, but 
extremists who commit violent acts of terror to further their purposes can be 
considered as such. Terrorism, for the purposes of this paper, will be defined as 
the “irregular use of violence by non-state groups against non-military targets 
and personnel for political ends” and requires not only acts or threats of violence 
but also the promotion of fear and terror to a broader audience. 7 Terrorists seek 
to radicalize moderates not only in their home countries but also abroad in 
Western, democratic countries. 
 
Some of those who become radicalized in Western countries may leave 
for places like Syria where the extremist movement has positioned itself within 
its own ‘Islamic State’, while some radicalized individuals remain within their 
Western countries providing support through recruitment, planning, and 
financing. It has been estimated that ISIS had previously drawn between 3,000 
to 6,000 Western fighters into its operations in Syria, with estimates having 
placed the number of women between 200 to 600 – some as young as 12.8 Many 
of these Western women, like their male counterparts, were second or third 
generation Muslim immigrants, but a number of them have also been Western 
converts to Islam. These women identify themselves with the term ‘muhajirah’ 
or ‘muhajirat’ – the Arabic term for “one who avoids or abandons bad things” 
and “migrant.” This is also linked to the term ‘hijra’ – the term used to describe 
migration from “lands inhabited by infidels to Muslim lands” which has also 
been a way for women to contribute to jihad.9 By using the term ‘muhajirat,’ 
                                                        
(Ottawa, Ontario: RCMP, 2009): 1.   
6 David A. Lake, “Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century,” 
Dialogue IO 1, no.1 (2002): 16. 
7 Ibid., 17.; Kathleen M. Blee, “Women and Organized Racial Terrorism in the United States,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no.5 (2005): 422. 
8 The Soufan Group, “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign 
Fighters into Syria and Iraq,” (2015): 4.; Jon Hembrey, “ISIS recruits: Radicalized young 
women motivated by ideology, sense of adventure,” CBC News, February 27, 2015, accessed 
May 18, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/isis-recruits-radicalized-young-women-motivated-by-
ideology-sense-of-adventure-1.2973691.; Anita Peresin and Alberto Cervone, “The Western 
Muhajirat of ISIS,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no.7 (2015): 495-6. 
9 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 495-6. 
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Western women proclaim three things: a clear discontent with their life or way 
of living in the West, a desire to migrate to a place of ideal perfection – the 
caliphate, and the religious motivation for undertaking such changes.10 While 
women seek to join any number of terrorist organizations, this paper will 
primarily concern itself with the women that have joined ISIS, as the 
radicalization of Western women into this group has grown into an exponential 
phenomenon over the past decade with little indication that the trend is slowing 
down.  
The Role of Female Terrorists 
ISIS is a Salafi jihadist militant group that has adopted the traditional Sunni 
Islam legal doctrine that distinguishes men’s and women’s duties to carry out 
jihad based on offensive or defensive jihad. Within Sunni Islam, offensive jihad 
(jihad al-talab) is a collective duty that exists to meet the needs of an Islamic 
state in an offensive position so that it is able to wage war against other states.11 
This can only be done under the command of an existing leader and considers 
the physical, familial, and financial position of a Muslim before he can volunteer 
for offensive jihad. Traditionally, only males who were fit, able, and mature 
could participate in offensive jihad so long as his family would not be financially 
burdened.12 Defensive jihad (jihad al-daf’) exists to meet the needs of those 
Muslims whose territories have been invaded or attacked, and are politically and 
militarily vulnerable with a lack of remediable options available to them.13 
Rather than a collective duty, defensive jihad does not require permission and 
can be performed individually. Classically, this defensive jihad was an 
obligation to be undertaken only by those in occupied territory or those closest 
to it. Contemporary jihadists have broadened the scope of classical defensive 
jihad from this territorial-basis to cover the globe, as they reject the legitimacy 
of the existing political world order for attacking Muslims around the world.14 
Terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and ISIS support this contemporary 
understanding of defensive jihad and use it to describe their fight against infidels 
of ‘kuffar’ in the West. 
 
                                                        
10 Ibid., 497. 
11 Nelly Lahoud, “The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis’ Exclusion of Women from Jihad,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no.5 (2014): 781. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 782. 
Hailey Robinsmith       Page 6 
 
 
 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict and 
Warfare  
 
Women’s role in this defensive jihad differs based on the terrorist 
organization. Some groups, al Qaeda being a notable example, have allowed 
women to hold positions as suicide bombers because this allows women to carry 
out their yearning for a combat role while simultaneously denying them any 
power or status since their lives do not endure after carrying out their mission.15 
Even under defensive jihad, most terrorist organizations built upon traditional 
Sunni Islamic law have excluded women from the battlefield based on the need 
to protect women’s modesty and keep men away from the distraction of women 
who ‘tie them to this world.’16 Female jihad has thus been considered different 
than that of males, consisting mainly of support for their husbands and raising 
their children with a love of jihad. In some cases, women have been included in 
the administrative side of terrorist organizations such as recruiting and financing. 
Within ISIS, most foreign women recruits have fulfilled the role of jihadi bride. 
They marry male fighters, bear them children, and raise the children in 
accordance with Shariah law. Recruiters have previously focused on giving 
Western women a romanticized notion of life as a wife to ISIS soldiers and have 
played into the idea of the caliphate as bringing freedom from Western 
oppression with regular comforts such as shopping and dining at coffee shops 
with girlfriends.17  
 
 Over the years, a number of Canadian women have left Canada for Syria, 
including a 20-year-old woman who called herself Umm Haritha. She arrived in 
Syria in late 2013 and was quickly married to a 26-year-old Palestinian foreign 
fighter from Sweden named Abu Ibrahim al-Suedi. Five months later, al-Suedi 
was killed in an attack from a rival group and Umm Haritha started a blog 
dedicated to offering advice and guidance to other would-be jihadi wives. She 
posted pictures of community buildings, Islamic clothing stores, and stories 
about her friends. During her childhood, Umm Haritha had lived in Canada and 
had a ‘normal,’ ‘middle class’ life for 14 years before her move to Syria.18 When 
asked about the reason for the move, she replied that she desired to “live a life 
of honour” under Islamic law as she felt “life was degrading and an 
                                                        
15 Jessica Davis, “Evolution of the Global Jihad: Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 36, no.4 (2013): 288. 
16 David Cook, “Women Fighting in Jihad,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no.5 (2005): 
377.; Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 496. 
17 Cook, “Women Fighting,” 379.; Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 501. 
18 Nadim Roberts, “The life of a jihadi wife: Why one Canadian woman joined ISIS’s Islamic 
state,” CBC News, July 7, 2014, accessed July 19, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/the-
life-of-a-jihadi-wife-why-one-canadian-woman-joined-isis-s-islamic-state-1.2696385. 
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embarrassment and nothing like the multicultural freedom of expression and 
religion they make it out to be” describing her time in Canada wearing a niqab.19 
 
Estimates have put the number of foreign female members of ISIS close 
to 10 percent of all foreign members.20 Many of these women responded to the 
call of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, to assist in the building of the 
new caliphate through traditional household roles, as well as skilled or auxiliary 
positions such as doctors, nurses, and engineers. Not only were women expected 
to raise their children in the way of jihad, but select women were given authority 
over finances, operational logistics, recruitment of both male fighters and wives, 
meeting medical needs, and in some cases gathering and distributing 
intelligence.21 ISIS recognized that women often have better access to situations 
and areas where they can gather intelligence, or are better suited to recruit 
additional women due to their commonalities.22 Strategically, terrorist groups in 
general have used women in more high-profile attacks to garner increased media 
attention and expand their base of both support and recruitment, especially in 
cases where such bases are waning.23 These groups have also used women in 
operations as a way to recruit men by shaming them for not upholding a duty a 
woman is capable of, thereby motivating them to join the groups when they 
otherwise might not.24 While terrorist groups such as ISIS have particular 
motivations for recruiting women, the personal motivations of women and girls 
who seek to join terrorist groups are increasingly converging with these strategic 
and operational motives such that the number of female terrorists is growing.25 
 
 The radicalization of women and girls into terrorist organizations will 
likely continue as extremist ideology spreads over the internet to a larger 
audience than ever before. The flight of women, especially those who call the 
West their home, deserves to be an important focus of security organizations 
both nationally and internationally. While many women have decided to move 
overseas to join ISIS or other terrorist organizations, another concern should be 
the women who are unable to make the move and stay in the West. One such 
                                                        
19 Ibid. 
20 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 499. 
21 Ibid., 498. 
22 Anita Peresin, “Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, 
no.3 (2015): 31. 
23  Davis, “Evolution,” 284. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Katharina Von Knop, “The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Women,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 30, no.5 (2007): 398. 
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case occurred in December 2014 when a woman in Abu Dhabi carried out a 
lethal knife attack against an American woman.26 Women who have left a 
terrorist group and return disillusioned from their time overseas are likely to be 
less of a threat than the less-mobile women who are motivated by the jihadist 
ideology and carry out attacks in their home country as a sign of support for the 
group.27 Radicalization has been at the heart of both groups of women, whether 
they travel abroad or not, and it is this process that deserves the attention of 
security agencies. 
 
Government policy should seek to curb radicalization both before it 
begins and after it has developed. To do this effectively, the radicalization 
process and motivations of women who choose this path need to be 
comprehensively understood by academics, government, and security personnel 
alike.  
Recruitment Tactics and Social Media 
To understand the process of radicalization for a woman or girl in a Western 
state, the recruitment tactics being targeted at these women and girls need to be 
recognized. Social media is at the forefront of recruitment for foreign female 
members of terrorist groups. With the accessibility and ease with which groups 
can manipulate and spread propaganda, the terrorist narrative is stronger than 
ever before. ISIS has undeniably captured the essence of social media as a tool 
of recruitment through it use of websites like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, 
Instagram, Kik, WhatsApp, and Tumblr, among others.28 ISIS propaganda 
includes photos of daily life in ISIS-controlled territory where women are treated 
fairly as they carry out normal activities such as eating at restaurants, cooking, 
and spending time with their husbands.29 Peresin and Cervone note that ISIS’s 
use of social media fulfills three roles in an individual’s participation in jihad: 
radicalization, recruitment, and identity formation.30 Included within this 
process are all the steps necessary for recruitment, complete with a strict guide 
on a woman’s role in jihad. These steps include indoctrination, providing 
motivation for making hijra, travel information, help finding husbands, and 
guides on how to be the “ultimate wife” of ISIS’s fighters which includes proper 
                                                        
26 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 505. 
27 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 31. 
28 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 26. 
29 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 501. 
30 Ibid., 502. 
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behaviour, roles, and expected living conditions in the caliphate.31 ISIS 
continues its narrative by explicitly situating its expectations of women within a 
manipulated view of daily life in its territory. As will be seen, this has a strong 
impact on especially young female would-be terrorists. 
 
The role of women as recruiters on social media is especially noteworthy. 
Umm Haritha’s role as an ISIS recruiter has already been noted, but she is far 
from the only woman recruiter used by ISIS. Rather, ISIS uses many recruited 
foreign women to convince other Western women of the obligation faced by all 
Muslim women to participate in jihad and assist in the creation of the new 
caliphate. As more women radicalize and join ISIS, the more recruiters ISIS has 
at its disposal, which continues to fuel their media recruitment campaigns. 
Depicted within the ISIS recruitment narrative is a variety of motivations aimed 
at capturing the attention of as many individuals as possible. Many Western 
individuals are targeted based on their dissatisfaction they experience with their 
Western lives and are shown that their life in the caliphate will be relieved of 
these frustrations through video footage, communication with ISIS members, 
and photos depicting an “ideal” life.32 Additional propaganda shows video 
footage of ISIS’s battle victories, and images of the torture and executions of 
infidels and enemies, which feeds into the “jihadi-cool” culture conscripted by 
ISIS’s social media team.33  
 
Using social media allows ISIS to spread its narrative faster and further 
to a young generation complete with distorted views of life in the Islamic State 
thus triggering many to call it “an offensive strategy of psychological warfare.”34 
The reasons behind the effectiveness of ISIS’s social media campaign on 
Western women are extensive and varied as no single radicalized Western 
female has the exact same experiences with, or prior to, radicalization. The next 
section will look at who the Western female terrorist is – where she comes from, 
her age, her background, her religious and political stances, and her employment 
                                                        
31 Ibid., 503. 
32 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 25-6. 
33 Ibid., 27; Douglas Ernst, “‘Jihadi-cool’ subculture drives youth to Islamic State, says Muslim 
Council of Britain adviser”, The Washington Times, August 22, 2014, accessed July 29, 2016, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/22/jihadi-cool-subculture-drives-youth-to-
islamic-sta/#!. 
34 Ibid., 27; Jytte Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign 
Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no.1 (2015): 20. 
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history, to be followed by an examination of the different motivating factors at 
play in the process of radicalization. 
Who is the Female Terrorist? 
What is clear from a number of studies done on the radicalization of Western 
terrorists of both genders is that there are no concrete qualifications that can 
identify a person susceptible to radicalization. Previous profiles might have 
identified a radicalized female as young, unemployed, uneducated, leaving them 
resentful of their socio-political status and with too much free time to turn their 
anger into violence. While these factors might hold in some cases, they by no 
means encompass an overarching profile of ‘the female terrorist.’ Contemporary 
accounts have reviewed a number of known cases of women and girls joining 
terrorist groups and compared them across variable such as age, education, 
employment, marital status, immigration, religious connections, criminal 
history, and activism. What one study found was that out of 222 female terrorists, 
the majority were young, citizens of their home country, employed, educated to 
secondary level, and rarely involved in criminal proceedings. This particular 
study, done by Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, found that female terrorists 
were close in age, had similar immigration statuses, and played similar roles in 
terrorism as male terrorists, but often had achieved a higher level of education, 
were less likely to be employed, and were less likely to have prior connections 
in the activist community compared to males.35 As a study with one of the 
highest number of female subjects, the results allow for a general understanding 
of the average female terrorist. 
 
Using the available data, the age range of females involved in terrorism 
in the study extended from 12 to 66, with the mean age of 22.6 years, and with 
over 80% of female terrorists falling on the spectrum between 16 to 35 years of 
age.36 The majority of females had completed both secondary and post-
secondary education, which according to Jacques and Taylor suggests a tendency 
of female terrorists to achieve a high level of education.37 92% of all terrorists 
within the study were employed or full-time students during their initial 
introduction to terrorism, with 72% of males being employed and 53% of 
females, making it ultimately comparable to worldwide trends of employment.38 
                                                        
35 Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Myths and Realities of Female-Perpetrated Terrorism,” 
Law and Human Behaviour 37, no.1 (2013): 35. 
36 Ibid., 38. 
37 Ibid., 39-40. 
38 Ibid., 40. 
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In the sample of females, women were as likely to be married as single, but were 
more likely to be divorced when compared to men.39 7 women within the group 
(~3%) were found to have converted to a particular religion prior to or during 
their radicalization process.40 This statistic was found to be similar to the 4.5% 
conversion rate found across 40 countries in Barro, Hwang, and McClearly’s 
analysis of religious conversion.41 Little to no criminal history was found within 
the sample, but 30% of women were found to have been raised within activist 
households, and 34% for men. Of those women raised within activist families, 
approximately 61% related their terrorist motivations to family influences.42  
 
Ultimately, this study done by Jacques and Taylor suggests that existing 
stereotypes of female terrorists as uneducated and unemployed are not true and 
that economic hardship is not a strong risk factor for radicalization or terrorist 
activity.43 The lack of criminal history may result from the unwillingness of 
convicted terrorists to confess to further or prior crimes; it may be due to the 
unnecessary attention from law enforcement that it would draw to would-be 
terrorists; or it may indicate that having a criminal background is unrelated to an 
individual’s terrorist aspirations.44 Compared to males, female terrorists were 
less likely to have converted to a specific religion, were less likely to be 
employed, and were less likely to be immigrants – indicating a more individual 
approach to radicalization and terrorist activity than in males where the statistics 
emphasized more collective terrorist activity.45 Additionally, one third of the 
female terrorists examined in the Jacques and Taylor study had family 
connection to terrorist groups, indicating that activism among family members 
can play a role in the motivations of some women or girls to seek out terrorism.46 
 
These findings are consistent with a number of other studies that examine 
the phenomenon of Western terrorism. The New York Police Department 
released a report entitled “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat” 
which found that many of those involved in the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
came from non-radicalized, middle class families, and were Middle Eastern 
                                                        
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 40-41 
41 Ibid., 41.; Robert Barro, Jason Hwang, and Rachel McCleary, “Religious Conversion in 40 
Countries,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 49, no.1 (2010): 28. 
42 Jacques and Taylor, “Myths," 41. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 42. 
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students who were “not very religious, apolitical, and with unremarkable 
backgrounds. Most were fluent in English, Western-educated, and accustomed 
to the Western lifestyle.”47 Likewise, it has been found that terrorists with 
Western origins contradict the existing profile of the economically 
disadvantaged, uneducated, and unemployed terrorist.48 A number of studies 
state that terrorists active in Western countries tend to be from the second or 
third generation of immigrant families and at least outwardly appeared to be well 
integrated into their communities.49 In addition, the number of converts to radical 
Islam has been growing.50  
 
As Jacques and Taylor assert in an additional study, with the inability to 
distinguish a clear profile for a female terrorist, it is possible that the 
effectiveness of a terrorist group’s recruitment campaign in radicalizing women 
and girls lies in their approach to using different strategies to target different 
motivations, thereby encompassing a wider range of potential recruits.51 A 
variety of these motivations will be examined in the following section. 
Motivating Factors of Radicalization 
This section will look at six of the most common motivating factors associated 
with the radicalization of Western women and girls – identity, integration, 
political frustration, religion, personal motivations, and romanticism. 
Identity 
As has already been noted, the demographics that describe a Western, female 
terrorist are not extraordinary and are not subject to extreme pressures such as 
poverty or suffering. Rather, the average Western, female terrorist grows up in a 
relatively peaceful society, but may struggle with finding their identity within 
                                                        
47 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 76. 
48 Meytal Grimland, Alan Apter, and Ad Kerkhof, “The Phenomenon of Suicide Bombing: A 
review of psycho- logical and nonpsychological factors,” Crisis: The Journal of Crisis 
Intervention and Suicide Prevention 27, no.3 (2007): 115.; Mark R. Kebbell and Louise Porter, 
“An intelligence assessment framework for identifying individuals at risk of committing acts of 
violence extremism against the West,” Security Journal 25, no.3 (2012): 214-15. 
49 Lorne L. Dawson, “The Study of New Religious Movements and the Radicalization of 
Home-Grown Terrorists: Opening a Dialogue,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no.1 
(2009): 5.; Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 76.; Aidan Kirby, “The London 
Bombers as ‘Self-Starters’: A Case Study of Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of 
Autonomous Cliques,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 5 (2007): 421; Brendan 
O’Duddy, “Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist Radicalization in the UK,” PS: Political 
Science & Politics 41, no.1 (2008): 38.  
50 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 22. 
51 Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, 
Different Reasons?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no.4 (2008): 323. 
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that society, especially as they transition from adolescence or young adulthood 
to an independent, adult life.52 Young women in particular are still in the process 
of forming a social identity and their current social status may feel incomplete 
and uncertain. Some women or girls may find themselves drawn towards 
extremist Islam as a result of existing religious backgrounds or kin connections, 
despite the opportunities for upward growth in their Western society.53 For 
Muslim females, this may exist as tension between traditional values and liberal 
values, which may be imposed by their families and their friends on either side.54 
ISIS has adapted parts of their recruitment campaign to offer young women and 
girls struggling with their identity an alternative path – one that offers stability, 
acceptance, and a sense of belonging to a global cause so that they no longer 
have to struggle with the tension between Western, liberal values and traditional 
Islamic ones.55  
 
Other young women may be attracted to a global cause out of boredom 
with their “normal” lives and see joining ISIS as an act of empowerment, 
individuality, and meaning.56 Similarly, pressure from their peer group to join 
the “jihadi cool” culture can drive young women to seek a sense of belonging 
and identity within the culture.57 The process of seeking an identity and finding 
one within radical Islam is not reserved solely for the young. Women who find 
themselves at a crossroads in life due to extenuating circumstances concerning 
their economic situation, social position, political ideology, or personal reasons 
may be more vulnerable to an identity upheaval and become drawn to the 
empowering feeling of purpose and belonging to a global cause.58 
 
 Those women and girls who grow up as the second or third generation of 
immigrant families in a Western country may feel tension between their dual 
identities. Attempting to manage their Western identity with that of their Muslim 
identity can result in a feeling of crisis when confronted with conflicting ideals 
and expectations.59 This may result in extremist thinking if there is a strong 
                                                        
52 Dawson, “New Religious Movements,” 8. 
53 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 83. 
54 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 24. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Anne Speckhard, “Talking to Terrorists: What Drives Young People to Become Foreign 
Fighters for ISIS and other Terrorist Groups and What Can be Done in Response,” Freedom 
from Fear Magazine, 11, (2015): 3. 
58 Dawson, “New Religious Movements,” 7. 
59 Michael King and Donald M. Taylor, “The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A 
Hailey Robinsmith       Page 14 
 
 
 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict and 
Warfare  
 
dichotomy drawn between different groups resulting in an “us” versus “them” 
mentality.60 Extremist behaviour or attitudes may further result from the concept 
of ‘relative deprivation’ if these women or girls compare the conditions of the 
group that they identify most strongly with to other groups, and subjectively 
perceive the material, social conditions of their group as being disadvantaged 
and suffering from injustice.61 Feelings that result from relative deprivation, such 
as anger and frustration, can lead an individual to question their previously held 
beliefs and distance themselves from society making them open to the influence 
of criminal behaviour or violent radicalization.62 It is important to note that these 
individuals may be in either an advantageous or disadvantageous position within 
society while simultaneously experiencing group-based relative deprivation.63 
This group-based relative deprivation is more commonly associated with the 
collective action found in terrorist groups than personal deprivation.64  
Integration 
A lack of integration into society is another prominent factor in cases of 
radicalization. The NYPD report on radicalization states that Europe has failed 
to integrate those who make up the second and third generation of immigrant 
families and has thus contributed to a rise in the vulnerability of young Muslims 
to violent extremism.65 The lack of integration felt by these individuals 
contributes heavily to feelings of tension between their religious identity and 
their  secular Western identity, making them vulnerable to extremist ideology 
and rhetoric.66 Through social media accounts of Western ISIS recruits, women 
explain their feelings of alienation they encountered in their home country.67 
Umm Haritha, as noted earlier, is one such example as she describes her 
experience wearing a niqab in Canada as “degrading and embarrassing.”68 Umm 
Ubaydah is another foreign female recruit to ISIS who expressed her wish to live 
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in the Islamic State because it is a society that “abides by the law of Allah” – an 
enticing alternative to the negative attitudes she faced in the West.69 Alienation 
and isolation from one’s community can also increase perceived differences 
between one’s social group and other groups, which can in turn encourage 
negative attitudes towards those other groups.70 This can also contribute to 
feelings of relative deprivation as examined earlier.  
 
Individuals who become isolated as a result of a lack of integration into 
their community are also at a higher risk of engaging in violent extremism due 
to their detachment from less radicalized, more moderate members of society.71 
The time an individual spends with a group of violent extremists impacts their 
socialization because in many cases the longer they associate with radical ideas 
they may no longer be open to more moderate views.72 Likewise, those more 
moderate members of society may also not wish to associate themselves with the 
individual who now holds extreme views, thus extending their isolation and 
reinforcement of extreme attitudes.  
 
 Group-think is another factor at play in cases where an isolated or 
alienated individual seeks out groups that hold radical views. The NYPD report 
states that these groups “appear almost essential to progressing to the 
Jihadization stage – the critical stage that leads to a terrorist act.”73 Group-think 
acts as a force-multiplier for radical ideology as it equips individuals with greater 
access to training, skills, tools such as firearms, and the financial and 
motivational support that is necessary to carry out an attack.74 
Political Frustration 
Perceived group-based relative deprivation can be strongly influenced by the 
political conditions faced by specific groups. Violent extremists who subscribe 
to radical Islam perceive the existence of their group to be under threat from 
Western policies at home and abroad. A number of wars point to the suffering 
and persecution of Muslim populations through Western interventions, such as 
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those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.75 The judgment that Western policies are at the heart of the suffering of 
Muslims worldwide is a strong motivating factor in the process of 
radicalization.76 The way domestic counterterrorism policies are perceived by 
individuals in a community is another important factor. Whole communities can 
feel threatened by anti-terrorism policies when they feel unfairly discriminated 
against on the basis of religion, culture, or ethnic origin. The infamous ‘war on 
terror’ may be perceived by some as a specific ‘war on Islam’ which contributes 
to the tension that may already exist between one’s Muslim identity and their 
Western identity.77 These perceptions and beliefs become dangerous at the point 
that an individual feels that violent retaliation or revenge is necessary to stop, or 
to bring attention to, the injustice they feel is being brought against their group.78  
 
 Terrorist groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda have constructed their 
narrative to emphasize the injustices that Muslim communities across the world 
have suffered at the hand of Western states. Their recruitment campaigns reflect 
this narrative, portraying Muslims, Islam, and Islamic territory as being under 
attack from the West.79 The images and facts they present to their audience often 
show the real war-time suffering of Muslim populations across the Middle East, 
which lends credibility to their argument in the eyes of their supporters. 
Individuals who identify with this narrative often oppose domestic or foreign 
policies as the basis of this suffering and injustice. Muslims who lack such a 
belief, and are satisfied with their social and political condition, make up the 
more moderate members of their communities who usually lack the violent or 
radical attitude felt by those in the radicalization stage.80  
 Women and girls are just as likely as men to face these injustices with 
the added burden of inequality and subordination felt in strongly patriarchal 
societies. The frustration, dissatisfaction, and inequality felt by women and girls 
in these societies may make them vulnerable to radicalization if they construe 
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the terrorist narrative as offering them empowerment and personal freedom.81 
The entirety of women who are unhappy with their subordinated status in society 
are not necessarily more open to radicalization as it is also possible that their 
dissatisfaction may catalyze them into changing their personal circumstances 
through self-development and community dialogue, but vulnerability to 
radicalization and recruitment exists in those who reluctantly conform to their 
subordination.82  
 
Terrorist groups such as ISIS promote the opportunity for women to 
participate in building the ‘Islamic State’– a state and society free from Western 
corruption and discriminatory policies that lack respect for women.83 Rather than 
seeing it as ‘joining a terrorist group,’ ISIS markets this as an opportunity to 
create a pure state governed by Shariah law where women can practice Islam 
honourably and without discrimination.84 Under this narrative, women are able 
to participate and contribute to a society as opposed to the exclusion and limited 
opportunities they may face in traditional societies in their home country.85 An 
extreme view of female liberation understands participation in suicide attacks as 
the ability to “fulfil traditional male duties and [have] the chance of being 
honored by the society they are living in.”86 The feeling of injustice, suffering, 
and subordination, whether real or perceived, can be an extraordinary catalyst 
towards radicalization and recruitment for women and girls.    
Religion 
Religion is a motivating factor in a number of cases of radicalized women. Some 
women believe that the West is waging war on Islam and that it needs to be 
protected. Travelling abroad to join a terrorist group is also part of hijra – the 
religious duty to migrate and contribute to the building of the caliphate – a way 
for women to carry out their own jihad.87 Peresin notes that religious motivation 
is most often cited by women as the most important factor in their decision to 
radicalize, though she states that religious motivation alone is not enough to 
explain the commitment to hijra by Western Muslim women, which can only be 
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understood with a combination of motivating factors.88 A study done by 
Skillicorn, Leuprecht, and Winn shows that “belief in the salience of religion is 
associated with both high levels of religious activity and support for terrorist 
groups” and that “younger age is correlated with both higher levels of religious 
activity and support for terrorist groups.”89 That is not to say that religion itself 
is a risk factor, but that those who believe that their religion “justifies or 
necessitates violent actions is likely to increase the risk of being engaged in 
violent extremism.”90  
 
As for conversion to Islam, statistics show that the greatest source of 
religious conversion in Europe stems from European women marrying Muslim 
men.91 Western women who convert to Islam may have only a superficial 
understanding of the religion, or they may have been exposed to, or influenced 
by, those with a more violent interpretation of Islam, such as their husbands.92 
In these cases, women in the process of radicalizing may be drawn to the terrorist 
narrative which perpetuates images and speeches that show Islam as being under 
attack by the West and calls on men and women alike to defend it. One 
exemplary instance of this narrative occurred in 1998 with the issuing of a fatwa 
– a ruling on Islamic law – by Osama bin Laden that stated it was the individual 
duty of every Muslim, in any country, to kill Americans and their allies, both 
civilians and military.93 Islam as a religion is not necessarily violent, but there 
are undoubtedly individuals whose interpretations of it believe that it justifies 
the use of violence in its defense. Women who subscribe to this interpretation, 
along with any combination of other motivating factors, are more vulnerable to 
radicalization and recruitment to terrorist organizations. Women who have been 
radicalized and recruited use these beliefs to further justify their migration to the 
caliphate and domestic roles within it as a religious duty.  
Personal Motivations 
Personal motivations encompass a variety of beliefs and ideals held by individual 
women, in addition to those already mentioned. Compared to male involvement 
in terrorism, female involvement is more frequently attributed to personal 
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motivations than to religious motivations.94 The act of hijra by some women 
occurs because of a perceived humanitarian mission to help those affected by 
conflict, such as those in Syria or Iraq. A Scottish Muslim woman, Aqsa 
Mahmood, joined ISIS as a jihadi bride in an effort to help suffering Syrians.95 
Humanitarian sympathies for suffering or persecuted Muslims can contribute 
towards a vulnerability to radicalization when paired with political frustrations 
as mentioned earlier. The terrorist narrative of the war on Islam and Muslims, 
anger over foreign policies, and frustration with gender-based oppression can 
heighten one’s perception of suffering and injustices around the world, and make 
migration to the caliphate appear to be a way to contribute humanitarian help. 
The women who fall under this category tend to idealize their role in the 
caliphate and overestimate the freedom and contributions they will be able to 
make once they arrive in the Islamic State.96  
 
 Alternatively, the process of radicalization for many women may be 
triggered or inflamed by the need for vengeance. The loss of male family 
members due to suicide operations, counterterrorism interventions by the 
‘enemy,’ or failed missions can act as motivation for women to seek revenge.97 
It can also manifest itself as a sense of duty to take up where the male left off. 
Personal or family honour may also motivate women to pursue terrorism as a 
means of regaining lost or tarnished dignity as a consequence of strict social, 
religious, or cultural rules.98 Personal motivations may vary amongst radicalized, 
or radicalizing, women, but they tend to work in conjunction with additional 
motivating factors to sway women towards the pursuit of radical beliefs and 
attitudes. 
Romanticism 
Naïve and romanticized notions of what joining a terrorist organization entails 
can be attributed to the decisions of some women or girls to migrate abroad. 
Especially prevalent among young females, the notion of marrying a “heroic” 
foreign fighter can be attractive enough to encourage teenage girls to leave their 
Western life and join groups such as ISIS. The notion of having a brave, heroic 
husband is exponentially attractive to the naïve when combined with the promise 
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of a free house, financial rewards, and many Western comforts.99 Other 
romanticized ideals of moving to the caliphate include a sense of adventure – an 
escape from a “boring” life and teenage rebellion – an attempt to assert 
individuality.100 These women and girls are labelled as naïve because many of 
them who leave the West for these reasons do not fully understand ISIS’s 
ideology, the significance of the caliphate, or the roles they are expected to 
fulfill.101 This also makes avenues of manipulation, especially via social media, 
more effective for recruitment. In many of these situations however, relatives, 
friends, and acquaintances are the primary source of inspiration and recruitment 
for young individuals.102 However ideal their reasons for joining ISIS, Peresin 
notes that such motivation should not be construed as weak as it requires very 
strong motivation for women and young girls to leave behind their life, their 
family, and their friends and move to a conflict-ridden territory.103  
Expectations versus Reality 
Given the success of ISIS’s social media campaigns, the conditions and roles 
women expect to encounter in the caliphate are likely different from the realities 
of the situation. Women who leave the West with visions of combat are met with 
the reality of their domestic duty to populate and raise the next generation of 
jihad fighters for the caliphate. The Western comforts promised to new recruits 
are met with the disillusionment of life in a war-torn area, complete with failing 
infrastructure. Promises of a life of honour and respect under Shariah law are 
confronted by cruel treatment – including enslavement, forced marriage, and 
rape – by husbands and locals.104 In one case, Samra Kesinovic and Sabina 
Selimovic, two teens from Austria, had moved to Syria and became online 
‘poster girls’ for ISIS only later to desperately attempt to return home after being 
married to and impregnated by male fighters.105 Emotional realities include 
becoming a widow after a short time of marriage and at a young age, strict rules 
against contacting family members back home despite being promised those 
connections, and language-based communication problems with local people 
who discriminate against foreign women. 106 Those who have become 
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disillusioned with their life under ISIS’s rule have made attempts to return to 
their home countries, but are often met with further obstacles. Passports are 
usually confiscated on arrival to ISIS controlled territory and women have the 
additional burden of constant male companionship when in public, making 
leaving ISIS a perilous and exhausting endeavour.107 Those who are caught 
attempting to escape can face extreme punishments including disfigurement or 
execution.  
The Dangers of Domestic Terrorists 
For those women who do escape ISIS-controlled territory, a number of law 
enforcement challenges remain. Length and severity of legal punishments, 
likelihood of re-offense, and potential for rehabilitation and use in anti-
recruitment strategies are some of the questions to be examined upon return. 
Peresin states that women who do return home due to disillusionment and regret 
with their living arrangements in the caliphate will likely not be interested in 
pursuing violent acts of jihad once they return home.108 Yet, the possibility of 
women returning to the West with strong motivation to continue their jihadist 
mission, combined with any training they received in Iraq or Syria, necessitates 
serious security screening and considerations by law enforcement. This necessity 
needs to be balanced with fair opportunities for rehabilitation and reintegration 
to Western society as those who are discouraged from returning home due to 
harsh penalties and jail time may continue to live under Islamic law and continue 
their missions, thereby undercutting chances at reducing ISIS’s support. 
 
Other, perhaps more serious, challenges arise from radicalized women 
who stay within their home country rather than move abroad. The reasons for 
not making hijra are vast and varied, including familial reasons and financial 
complications. Studies have also found that women are more likely to participate 
and be more active in domestic terrorist operations because they perceive “a 
greater potential for change.”109 These women have the opportunity to act as 
recruiters within their communities as well as opportunities to commit violent 
attacks domestically. The muhajirat has urged Western women to carry out 
attacks against their countries. Instances of this have been seen in the UK, 
France, and the US. Umm Layth and Zehra Duman are two women involved in 
ISIS’s social media campaign that have instructed Western Muslims to commit 
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acts of violence in their home countries, using language such as “bring the 
battlefield to yourself,”110 and “kill Kuffar (non-believers) in alleyways, stab 
them and poison them. Poison your teachers. Go to haram restaurants and poison 
the food in large quantities.”111  
The biggest threat exists in the radicalized females that do not leave an 
active social media presence, thereby making their detection much more 
difficult. If ISIS calls on sympathisers in the West to commit attacks against their 
countries, domestic women may be instructed to carry out attacks such as the 
2016 Orlando nightclub shooting, the 2014 shooting of Corporal Cirillo in 
Ottawa, or small scale attacks using knives or homemade explosives.112 Peresin 
states that as of early 2015, there was no direct physical threat to the West from 
ISIS’ Western women, but that a shift in their roles may occur in the future.113 
As of Summer 2016, some scholars have begun to predict the collapse of ISIS 
as the group continues to be outmatched by conventional military forces and are 
increasingly losing territory and strongholds throughout Iraq and Syria.114 This 
could mean a call to arms for ISIS’ Western women to defend their commitment 
to a global jihad despite any collapse of the physical organization.115  
 
Given the rather ordinary demographics of Western women and girls 
vulnerable to radicalization, and the array of motivating factors that may 
influence them, a number of challenges exist for law enforcement, intelligence 
and security agencies, and government policy makers. The following section will 
examine the implications for national security via law enforcement, intelligence, 
government, policy, and counterterrorism strategy. Prevention, identification, 
evaluation, response, and reintegration strategies and initiatives will be the focus. 
Security Implications and Challenges 
While Canada has yet to experience a domestic terrorist attack carried out by a 
radicalized Canadian woman in the name of Islam fundamentalism, the security 
threat that these women pose should not go unconsidered. Canada’s law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies have been equipped to respond to and 
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prevent terrorist attacks since the FLQ made its appearance in 1963.116 However, 
Western counterterrorism preparedness in general suffers from a cultural 
reluctance to assume popular involvement of women in terrorist organizations, 
especially those of the extremist Islamic variety due to their historic hostility 
towards women.117 As such, the potential of these women to be used for 
counterterrorism and counterintelligence purposes has been ignored, and their 
potential destructiveness remains unanticipated and underestimated.118 This 
cultural denial on behalf of Western states, including Canada, gives an advantage 
to terrorist groups who can use women in important roles while going relatively 
unnoticed. The continued use of women as recruiters for ISIS and other terrorist 
organizations should be especially concerning as the spread of propaganda along 
with the ease of access and concealment of online identities and activities is 
difficult to monitor and control.  
 
 As for Canada specifically, it is unlikely that the country hosts specific 
factors that influence the radicalization of women significantly in either direction 
when compared to other Western countries. Canada’s geography may make it 
less likely for an attack to occur domestically, given the ease of movement 
between states in Western Europe and the fact that the highest numbers of female 
radicalization come from countries like France, Germany, the UK, and 
Belgium.119 Canada’s liberal, multicultural society may not necessarily be a 
deterrent to female radicalization, or radicalization in general, but its history of 
passive foreign policy decisions may be less of a motivating factor than more 
aggressive states such as the US or UK. One counter-instance was Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper’s strongly one-sided policy in support of Israel and 
against Palestine. This could have been a motivating political factor in the 
radicalization of Canadian women at the time and may have provoked thoughts 
of domestic terrorism that failed to materialize. Canada’s new Liberal leadership 
has employed a more even approach to the Israel-Palestine issue and has 
replaced Harper’s ambassador to Israel, bringing hope that current and future 
radicalizing sentiments on the issue will be mitigated. Canada’s extensive 11-
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year involvement in Afghanistan and its currently minor but growing role in 
Syria and Iraq also stand to produce anger towards the Canadian state and its 
population by women with family in these states. Abating this anger and 
frustration towards Canada on behalf of these women is an especially important 
challenge in cases where relatives have been killed or wounded in war-time 
action. 
 Challenges for Canada exist in the ability to prevent, identify, evaluate, 
respond to, and reintegrate radicalized Canadian women. In the beginning stages 
of radicalization, women are unlikely to travel and do not participate in criminal 
or activist activities, making it hard for law enforcement or intelligence agencies 
to discover and monitor such individuals.120 In addition, not all radicalization 
leads to violent behaviour,121 which creates a dual dilemma for law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies. First, a blanket profile of radical behaviour cannot be 
applied to the situation because radicalized individuals do not necessarily 
express their beliefs in the same way as others. This also holds the potential for 
discrimination claims based on racial or cultural profiling if an individual 
believes they are being targeted based on external factors. Secondly, radical 
attitudes and speech that are non-violent and do not promote violence cannot be 
legally impeded and present the dilemma of not being able to stop what may be 
a motivating factor for a radical individual more prone to violence and 
extremism. 
 
  Challenges regarding social media relate to privacy and censorship 
concerns and the lack of legal and cyber capabilities to permanently shut down 
or track online terrorists. The ability of terrorists to conceal and create multiple 
identities, encrypt messages, and hide their locations makes tracking and 
identifying every terrorist and their supporters almost impossible. States that take 
a more forward approach to criminalizing online support for terrorism, such as 
the UK’s Terrorism Act of March 2006 which criminalized the “encouragement 
of terrorism,” are subject to legal boundaries pertaining to free speech, the 
protection of historical narratives and legitimate group identities, and beyond.122  
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Canadian Responses 
Within Canada, knowledge and resources on countering domestic extremism and 
radicalization is shared between 18 departments and agencies under the 
Combating Violent Extremism Working Group (CVEWG).123 The CVEWG has 
developed a “whole of government” approach with three fundamental 
endeavours: “1) detect and disrupt the work of violent extremists; 2) Build 
resilient communities; 3) Develop research, including outreach to academics.”124 
Documents made available by Public Safety Canada (PSC) describe initiatives 
that enhance the surveillance capabilities and community outreach aimed at 
primarily immigrant and Muslim communities, including: the PSC Citizen 
Engagement Program focused on outreach towards youth and immigrants to 
Canada; PSC’s Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security (CCRS) with its own 
Sub-Group on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism aimed at outreach 
towards Muslim communities; and the RCMP’s National Security Community 
Outreach Program with the mandate of establishing trust and “cooperation in 
protecting Canada’s national security” within minority communities, including 
Muslim ones.125  
 
 Challenges arise even in efforts to counter violent extremism and 
domestic radicalization. While these initiatives have proven effective and fruitful 
to their goals, Monaghan warns of the potential of falling into a feedback-loop 
as found within UK counterterrorism campaigns. With such a focus of 
surveillance and outreach towards Muslim and immigrant communities, feelings 
of discrimination, targeting, isolation, and even criminalization can occur.126 
Such feelings are often precursors to radicalization, as seen in previous sections, 
and can result in the exact outcomes the initiatives were meant to prevent.  
 
Distinctly lacking in Canada’s counterterrorism approach is discussion 
of the female risk regarding radicalization and terrorism. Various government 
documents and partnerships address radicalization and counterterrorism from a 
broad approach with little mention of gender and the impacts it has on 
                                                        
narratives promoted by terrorist groups that seek to use only a portion of the truth and bend the 
rest of the narrative to fit their own ideology. 
123 Jeffrey Monaghan, “Security Traps and Discourses of Radicalization: Examining 
Surveillance Practices Targeting Muslims in Canada,” Surveillance & Society 12, no.4 (2014): 
486. 
124 Ibid., 491.  
125 Ibid., 493;  
126 Ibid. 495. 
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radicalization. As seen in earlier sections, the different motivating factors of 
radicalization affect males and females in different ways and to different 
degrees. Also lacking is a plan for the development and implementation of a 
counter-narrative to challenge the wide-spread terrorist narrative examined 
earlier, especially through the use of social media. Exit strategies for returning 
women and girls from Syria or other terrorist-controlled areas abroad is another 
challenge. As seen previously, this can prevent women from returning home to 
be reintegrated if punishments are decidedly harsh, or on the opposite side, mild 
punishments can encourage more women to return under the guise of 
disillusionment only to carry out an attack once back in domestic society. An all-
encompassing counterterrorism strategy and counter-radicalization programs 
need to take into account these differences and challenges. The next section will 
attempt to address them. 
Recommended Initiatives 
This final section will recommend a number of initiatives and programs to 
address challenges in combating female radicalization in Canada. These 
recommendations will fall into 5 categories – gender-based initiatives with a 
focus on women’s rights; integrating immigrants and fostering respect and trust 
within Muslim communities; exit strategies, de-radicalization, and re-integration 
of returning female terrorists; comprehensive counter-narratives including the 
use of social media, education, and de-radicalized individuals; and ‘smart 
counterterrorism’ and policing.  
Women-Focused Initiatives 
One notable course of action being taken within a number of Islamic societies in 
Central Asia and Africa is the advancement of Islamic feminism, which emerged 
from the reinterpretation of Islamic religious sources with a focus on gender 
equality. Islamic feminism bases itself on gender-egalitarian and gender-
progressive discourse to empower women in societies where patriarchal 
extremist discourse was, and is, heavily influential – such as Iran, South Africa, 
and Egypt.127  This phenomenon emerged in the 1990s in response to the struggle 
of women against established social norms and subordination in political and 
economic spheres in these countries.128 It focuses on creating more gender-equal 
societies and exposing the existing interpretations of the Quran as unfairly 
patriarchal. When confronted with extremism, Islamic feminism offers the 
                                                        
127 Badran, “Women and Radicalization,” 2-3. 
128 Heidi Basch-Harod, “Women of the Middle East: The Jihad Within,” Palestine-Israel 
Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture 17, no. 3 & 4, 121. 
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legitimization of other roles and responsibilities beyond those offered by 
extremist groups. It is hypothesized that linking Islamic feminism with 
development assistance and concrete initiatives can help curb the appeal of 
extremist groups.129 Badran warns that although the message of Islamic 
feminism has been accepted in numerous communities, the actual term ‘Islamic 
feminism’ remains controversial in many of these societies and needs to be used 
with sensitivity within local communities.130 The phenomenon of Islamic 
feminism is one that should be supported in Canada. 
 
To counter terrorist narratives and extremist ideology in Canada, 
especially within more traditional Muslim communities, Canada’s current and 
future outreach initiatives should use and encourage dialogue that promotes 
gender-progressive discourse. Offering roles and responsibilities in the creation 
of community programs or dialogues to Muslims of all ages could help foster a 
feeling of inclusiveness and respect while simultaneously offering alternatives 
to extremist options. Abroad, Canada’s security forces could use Islamic 
feminist rhetoric to promote values in those communities where it is assisting in 
the rebuilding and defence of societies vulnerable to extremism. The curbing and 
transformation of gender-based oppression has the potential to not only stop 
radicalization amongst women, but it also gives them the opportunity to play a 
role in preventing it through empowerment, development, and leadership at local 
levels. 
 
 In addition to challenging gender inequality in traditionally patriarchal 
societies, focus should be given to providing forums for debate on gender and 
law as well as inter-cultural dialogue, and legal literacy training for women and 
new immigrants.131 Giving women the opportunity to be aware of their rights 
and freedoms under both Islamic law and the laws of their home country can 
offer empowerment and protect against feelings of alienation and oppression. 
Doing so would help communicate understanding of new cultures and prevent 
isolation within vulnerable communities.132  
 
Engaging local Muslim women as active leaders in their communities – 
including through education, cultural and religious activities, and the media – 
                                                        
129 Badran, “Women and Radicalization,” 8. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Badran, “Women and Radicalization,” 9. 
132 Council of the European Union, Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 
Recruitment to Terrorism, 9956/14 (May 19, 2014): 9. 
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can promote women’s empowerment not only to local Muslim communities, but 
to other communities within Canada, thus fostering greater respect and 
understanding of Muslim women throughout the country. Encouraging the 
leadership of women within and outside of their communities also promotes their 
further education in the political, economic, and social sphere of a society.133 It 
can also encourage women who have experiences with radicalization or 
extremism to speak out about their experiences and contribute to counter-
radicalization initiatives within their communities.134 
 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
suggests that governments should endeavour to connect and interact with small 
women’s organizations at the grassroots level in addition to any larger 
organizations, as grassroots organizations have a better chance of interacting 
with individuals vulnerable to radicalization.135 Within this outreach, the OSCE 
recommends that governments identify and promote common goals in 
countering extremism and radicalization as ‘points of engagement’ with 
women’s organizations as such concerns are often not among the top 
priorities.136 The Canadian government should also listen to and attempt to 
correct concerns that these women’s organizations hold, as doing so may address 
factors of radicalization within these communities.137  
 
Furthermore, effort should be made to involve women, including Muslim 
women as well as women in general, in political and security sectors – especially 
those addressing armed conflict.138 The UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1325 On Women, Peace and Security stated the importance of 
including women in full and equal roles in the area of security.139 As a member 
of the United Nations (UN), Canada should seek to address and implement this 
resolution within its government and eliminate barriers among other levels of 
government. Rather than risk the adoption of radical and extremist attitudes, 
                                                        
133 Susan T. Fiske, “A Millennial Challenge: Extremism in Uncertain Times,” Journal of Social 
Issues 69, no.3 (2013): 609. 
134 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Women and Terrorist 
Radicalization Final Report (Vienna, Austria: OSCE Secretariat, 2011/2012): 10. 
http://www.osce.org/secretariat/99919?download=true. 
135 Ibid., 8. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Badran, “Women and Radicalization,” 9. 
139 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, On Women, Peace and Security, 
S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000). 
Hailey Robinsmith       Page 29 
 
 
 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict and 
Warfare  
 
presenting alternative roles and responsibilities for women in the form of 
employment, dialogue, and recommendation allows them to avoid extremism 
and actively work against it. Women can work as policy makers and advisors, 
teachers, and community activists to address and counter radicalization locally 
and nationally. This can also include giving feedback on current 
counterterrorism policy and its success or failure within different 
communities.140  
 
As the “EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to 
Terrorism” states, respect for full human rights and fundamental freedoms is one 
of the foundations to countering terrorism and radicalization.141 Canada’s 
counterterrorism policy reflects this and can only be strengthened by the further 
inclusion of women at all levels of government and community outreach. 
Collaboration with grassroots women’s organizations, and support for women 
leaders in education, security, government, religion, and cultural domains will 
promote the voice and concerns of women in recognizing vulnerabilities to, and 
factors of, radicalization.  
Integration and Trust within Immigrant and Muslim Communities 
Helping Muslim Canadians feel at home within Canada is an essential part of 
counter-radicalization measures.142 As seen earlier, feelings of alienation and 
isolation that stem from a lack of integration into society are motivating factors 
for radicalization. Community outreach with the goal of developing sustained 
and strong connections with Muslim communities can play a preventative role. 
Not only should the outreach be directed towards community leaders, but women 
from all levels within different communities should be able to voice their 
concerns in order to gain a more comprehensive approach of the issues facing 
women. Efforts should be taken to ensure that Muslim communities do not feel 
as though they are being targeted or discriminated against based on their religion, 
culture, or ethnic origin. In this vein, governments in Ottawa should avoid 
extreme partiality towards one culture or group of people over another, whether 
at home or abroad. The Harper government’s strong support for Israel over 
Palestine is an example of how this partiality has the potential to create 
unnecessary risk towards radicalization based on feelings of injustice and 
frustration at Canada’s foreign policy. Outreach programs should focus on 
                                                        
140 OSCE, Final Report, 2. 
141 Council of the European Union, Revised, 5. 
142 Esther Solis Al-Tabaa, “Targeting a Female Audience: American Muslim Women’s 
Perceptions of al-Qaida Propaganda,” Journal of Strategic Security 6, no.3 (2013): 13. 
Hailey Robinsmith       Page 30 
 
 
 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict and 
Warfare  
 
creating trust and cooperation while ensuring that all support and dialogue is a 
two-way street and that the communities are welcoming of the program. Culture 
and religion should be respected and observed in all communication, which 
should also avoid linking Islam to terrorism.143 The second part of this is to 
encourage existing Muslim communities to meet with new Muslim immigrants 
and assist with their integration into the community.144 This includes ensuring 
that Muslim women have access to the support of other women, education, and 
that they are aware of their rights and freedoms so they feel secure in their new 
country. 
 
 Families are an especially important resources for countering 
radicalization and should be utilised as such. Young women in particular usually 
have strong connections to their families, making them an important step in the 
prevention of radicalization. In cases of individual females radicalizing and 
joining terrorist groups, there is little evidence that their families are supportive 
of their choice, compared to families with multiple radicalizing members.145 In 
these cases, family members are usually shocked when they learn that their 
daughter or sister joined a terrorist organization and are desperate to bring them 
back home.146 Government units cooperating with communities can work with 
families who suspect that their daughter or sister is showing signs of 
radicalization. They can also work with families who are trying to bring back a 
female family member from abroad. This can include intelligence collection 
from Syria or Iraq, organization of return flights, and de-radicalization and 
reintegration once back in Canada.147  
Exit Strategies and Reintegration 
                                                        
143 Jorg Monar, “Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union’s Counter-
Terrorism Strategy and its Problems,” Government and Opposition 42, no.3 (2007): 297.; By 
linking Islam to terrorism, governments promote a number of politically repressive responses 
to terrorist attacks, including the surveillance and deportation of Muslim immigrants and 
refugees based on fear of further attacks. Avoiding this link not only avoids undue 
discrimination and frustration on behalf of Muslim populations, but also avoids the furtherance 
of Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ ideology between Europeans and Middle 
Eastern and African ‘civilizations’ which has the potential to promote radicalization within the 
process of preparation for such a ‘clash.’ 
144 Marie Wright, “TECHNOLOGY & TERRORISM: How the Internet Facilitates 
Radicalization,” Forensic Examiner 17, no.4 (2008): 19. 
145 Peresin, “Fatal Attraction,” 22. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Peresin and Cervone, “The Western Muhajirat,” 505. 
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De-radicalization is just as important as preventing radicalization when it comes 
to violent extremism. For Western women living in ISIS-controlled territory who 
regret their decision to move abroad, exit strategies need to be in place. To 
encourage their return, it is necessary to ensure that potential punishments for 
having joined the terrorist group are not excessively harsh. One suggestion is to 
show that severe punishment will not be a cause for concern for those who 
participate only in domestic roles as a jihadi wife and when no crimes are 
committed.148 Rather, strict punishments should be saved for those who carried 
out violent acts and crimes. Additionally, voluntary disengagement from 
terrorism and life in the caliphate could be grounds for penalty reductions.149 The 
criminalization of all instances of radicalization and migration to Syria would 
prevent those who truly do regret their decision from returning home, and could 
cost Canada critical intelligence and counterterror opportunities. To ensure that 
Canada develops the best disengagement and exit strategies for its needs and the 
needs of Canadian female former terrorists, consultations should be carried out 
with governments of other states who have experience in the area, with 
academics specializing in radicalization, with practitioners from a variety of 
relevant fields, vulnerable women, former terrorists, non-governmental 
organizations, and with victims of terrorism around the world.150   
 
Upon their successful return to Canada, attempts should be made to 
reintegrate these women into society. A number of academics suggest 
surveillance of the returning individuals including monitoring of social media 
accounts, re-education to embrace a more moderate Islam, and involvement in 
anti-radicalization campaigns as a witness that can attest to their negative 
experiences within ISIS. Families are also instrumental in providing stability and 
monitoring for signs of re-radicalization. Cooperation between law enforcement 
and families should thus be immediately established and continuously 
maintained in cases of returning female terrorists in order to keep the exchange 
of information regarding these individual women open. Further, education 
programs centered on reprogramming former terrorists with a moderate 
interpretation of Islam and correcting misperceptions about the religion have 
proven successful in past cases. In Egypt, experts from Al-Azhar University have 
de-radicalized members of the terrorist group Al-Jihad Al-Islami through 
‘ideological revision’ – the process of being re-educated about Islam so that 
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extremist misperceptions are corrected through dialogue and a promotion of 
moderation.151 If reintegration does not occur, returning women will likely 
become outcasts of society as they suffer from a marked criminal record, a loss 
of education and employability, health issues such as post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), and instability with personal relationships including family.152 
To prevent re-recruitment, leadership opportunities for women in community-
based counterterrorism and anti-radicalization programs is suggested to give de-
radicalized women a role and social identity once they have returned in order to 
undermine exclusion and isolation.153  
Counter-Narratives 
Comprehensive counter-narratives need to be established and utilised across 
social media and in education forums to challenge the pervasive terrorist 
narrative that shows Islam and Muslims as being under attack from the West. 
Research into the impact of the terrorist narrative on different audiences can be 
conducted to discover different elements that can be controlled and countered. 
Out of the many elements of counterterrorism strategies, counter-narratives 
should be near the top of the list as they are simpler to address than other 
motivating factors or counterterrorism strategies explored in this paper, which 
are often long-term strategies.154 Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the 
population can counteract a number of the motivating factors for recruitment 
such as political frustration and isolation. The “EU Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism” suggests working with community 
leaders including public figures, teachers, families, academics, religious leaders, 
and media and entertainment personalities who can influence public opinion and 
advance a positive counter-narrative.155  
 
 These counter-narratives should encourage the development and spread 
of a reformist Islam. This would include the promotion of Islam’s ‘itjihad’ – 
independent thinking – as a way of questioning the traditional and repressive 
view of Islam promoted by terrorist groups. Also necessary is the advancement 
of Islamic feminist discourse that welcomes women as leaders that are capable 
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of creating change and opportunities for both themselves and other women 
within Islam and outside of it. Counter-narratives that embrace the long-term 
development of reformist Islam have the potential to grab the attention of 
Muslim Canadians who are devoted to their faith but may disagree with the 
repressive ideologies of ISIS associated with traditional Islam. This can not only 
dissuade future radicalization, but can be used to establish Muslim Canadian 
leaders in the fight against terrorism and its leaders who would use radical Islam 
to call supporters to the battlefield.156 
 
 Utilizing social media in this endeavour should be a priority for Canada. 
In current efforts to close accounts held by terrorists and recruiters, monitor 
subscribers and support, and gather information from chat rooms – those 
responsible for monitoring the social media accounts of women could hold a 
specialization in women’s psychology in order to establish an understanding of 
their mentality and create connections with them.157 The federal government of 
Canada can also create websites, blogs, video channels, forums, social media 
accounts, and video games aimed at promoting a positive counter-narrative in 
order to reach a broad set of demographics.158 Wright also suggests assisting 
allies in creating multimedia counter-narrative campaigns as terrorist 
propaganda is spread globally over the internet and should be a concern for all 
governments.159 
 
 Former women terrorists present an additional opportunity in the creation 
and implementation of effective counter-narratives. Those women who became 
disillusioned with living in ISIS territory and escaped back to Canada can talk 
about their experiences abroad, why they decided to join, and why they made the 
decision to come back. This is useful for researchers to further understand the 
causal mechanisms behind the decisions of females to radicalize and the appeal 
of narratives, and create counter strategies targeted at them. It is also useful as 
an education experience for those women in the process of radicalizing who may 
                                                        
156 A prominent Muslim Canadian working towards this goal is Irshad Manji, a Vancouver-
based Muslim academic who has written two books on reforming Islam and how to reconcile 
faith and freedom against repressive ideologies. Her work The Trouble with Islam Today: A 
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hear these testimonies and become disenchanted with the realities of joining a 
terrorist group. Counter-narratives should be created differently based on their 
targets. Those targeted at women should be created with specific language and 
imagery that appeals to women and girls in Canada.160 
 
 Lastly, establishing counter-narratives in the education process is critical 
to undermining the first stages of radicalization among youth. One suggestion is 
to educate students in middle school and above about how terrorist groups recruit 
and what signs to look out for, showing why the intentional targeting of civilians 
is never acceptable, and equipping students with problem solving skills that do 
not use violence.161 Other suggestions state that teaching children about human 
rights, acceptance of alternatives and how many parts of society are socially 
constructed, diversity and inclusion, and critical thinking can allow children and 
teenagers to examine and resolve disputes and problems without resorting to 
violence and with respect for all people in a community.162 Student activism 
including human rights advocacy, political public debates with government 
leaders, and plays and presentations about social justice to younger children can 
also support a counter-narrative amongst youth.163 
‘Smart Counterterrorism’ and Policing 
As talk of the potential collapse of ISIS continues, law enforcement and security 
agencies need to be aware of the threat posed by female terrorists more than ever. 
Historically, terrorist groups that experience pressures such as collapse are more 
likely to use women for suicide attacks out of desperation for media attention, 
recruitment, and support.164 ‘Smart counterterrorism’ is one way to approach the 
added security threat this poses. It is a multi-agency approach to 
counterterrorism that includes government, federal departments and agencies, 
NGOs, the travel industry, the higher education community, and businesses.165 
It calls on preventive, defensive, and offensive measures aimed at winning the 
hearts and minds of the population.166 This approach would not only allow 
information to be shared across multiple departments, but it would also extend 
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the amount and scope of available information. This could allow different law 
enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies to cut down on repetitive 
procedures and tasks and increase the range of duties it can carry out in the name 
of counterterrorism. It is also important for Canada to ensure that law 
enforcement agencies conduct gender training and include women in the 
different levels and sectors of policing. This allows law enforcement to avoid 
human rights violations when dealing with women in the public, which has the 
potential to trigger radicalization in vulnerable individuals who are already near 
the tipping point.167 Further, Canada should be cautious in its approach to 
targeted killings in the name of counterterrorism. Collateral damage has the 
strong potential to contribute to the terrorist narrative of the West attacking 
Muslims and can anger national citizens over the choice of foreign policy.168 
 
 Drawing on lessons from the New York Police Department, Canada 
could encourage its law enforcement personnel to pursue language training in a 
number of foreign languages to greater extend its ability to interact with 
Canada’s multicultural population.169  A comprehensive and international 
database on female terrorism should also be established. An international 
database could contain intelligence from a number of different sources and 
countries on female participation in various terrorist organization including 
surveillance, methods of recruitment, factors of radicalization, interviews, 
statistics, and trends.170 This would help prevent cross-border flows of 
radicalized female terrorists and add to the pool of intelligence and knowledge 
on female terrorism for all countries involved. In regards to human intelligence 
(HUMINT), female assets should be employed in efforts to gain access and 
information on terrorist organizations due to their potential range of access to 
female terrorists.171  
 
While many of these suggestions and recommendations will not stop 
terrorist organizations from recruiting women the goal is to prevent further 
radicalization through: decreasing the vulnerability of women to motivating 
factors and eliminating all possible factors; equipping law enforcement, security, 
and intelligence agencies with as much relevant knowledge and tools as possible 
                                                        
167 OSCE, Final Report, 7. 
168 Prezelj, “Smart,” 52. 
169 Brian Nussbaum, “Protecting Global Cities: New York, London and the Internationalization 
of Municipal Policing for Counter Terrorism,” Global Crime 8, no.3 (2007): 221. 
170 Cunningham, “Countering Female Terrorism,”124. 
171 Ibid., 125. 
Hailey Robinsmith       Page 36 
 
 
 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict and 
Warfare  
 
to increase effectiveness in preventing, identifying, evaluating, and responding 
to female radicalization and terrorism; and decreasing the ability of terrorists to 
utilise surprise and tactical advantage against Western countries and their law 
enforcement agencies. 
Conclusion 
 Female radicalization remains a challenge for Canada. Despite any 
speculation about the status of ISIS, the motivating factors behind the 
radicalization of women and girls from Western, democratic states will continue 
to exist in society. This paper has presented 6 of the strongest motivating factors 
behind female radicalization – the search for an identity, a lack of integration 
into one’s community, political frustration, religious beliefs, personal 
motivations, and naivety and romanticism. These factors affect both genders 
without reservation, but women have the additional burden of gender-based 
stereotypes and oppression that try to conform and subordinate them – especially 
in more traditional, patriarchal societies. As radicalized women and girls migrate 
to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS, the security of their Western home countries is put 
at risk. As suicide bombers, jihadi wives, or domestic terrorists, radicalized 
women hold the potential to give away intelligence about their home country and 
carry out attacks against it. These concerns do not exclude Canada, and in 
response, the Canadian security scene has made a number of attempts to prevent, 
identify, and reintegrate radicalized female terrorists in Canada. To increase the 
effectiveness of Canadian methods of prevention, identification, evaluation, 
response, and reintegration, this paper suggests the implementation of a number 
of initiatives and strategies focusing on gender and women’s rights; the 
integration of immigrants and the trust of Muslim communities; exit strategies 
and reintegration; counter-narratives; and smart counterterrorism. The hope is 
that through coordinating research, intelligence, and strategies, Canada’s law 
enforcement and security agencies can broaden their scope and capabilities to 
better understand and respond to the threats from female radicalization. 
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